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INTRODUCTION
An officer illegally stops a man without reasonable suspicion,
violating his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search
and seizure. Based on information gained during this illegal stop, the
officer searches the man and discovers drugs and paraphernalia.1
The exclusionary rule to the Fourth Amendment states that when
an officer, through his own illegal act, discovers evidence against a
defendant, such evidence cannot be used against the defendant.2
Therefore, in the above example, because the officer only found the
evidence because of an illegal stop, the exclusionary rule should
prevent the evidence from being used against the man.
However, in June of 2016, the Supreme Court in Utah v. Strieff 3
declined to apply the exclusionary rule in the very situation described
above.4 In this case, after Officer Fackrell stopped defendant Strieff
without reasonable suspicion, he discovered an outstanding arrest
warrant in Strieff’s name for a completely unrelated traffic violation.5
Fackrell then arrested Strieff and conducted a search incident to the
arrest authorized by the warrant.6 During this search, Fackrell found
methamphetamines and drug paraphernalia.7 While conceding that
the original stop was illegal, the Court held that the evidence was

1. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016) (holding that evidence was
admissible under the attenuation doctrine because officer’s conduct was not flagrant).
2. See generally Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
4. Id. at 2064.
5. Id. at 2059.
6. Id. at 2060.
7. Id. (“When Officer Fackrell searched Strieff incident to the arrest, he
discovered a baggie of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.”).
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admissible because of an exception to the exclusionary rule known as
attenuation.8
Attenuation means that when the causal connection between the
illegal conduct and the acquisition of evidence is remote or
“attenuated” enough, the evidence may be admissible.9 The Court
applies a three-factor test to assess the connection.10 One of these
factors is “purpose and flagrancy of official misconduct.”11 In Strieff,
the Court ruled that the evidence was admissible under the
attenuation exception because the officer’s conduct was not
flagrant.12 However, the Court never explained how it came to that
conclusion, nor did it indicate what distinguishes flagrant conduct
from non-flagrant conduct.13
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct
by removing the incentive for an officer to conduct an illegal search
or seizure.14 The Supreme Court has explicitly tied flagrancy to this
deterrent purpose—the more flagrant a violation is, the greater the
need to deter that behavior by applying the exclusionary rule.15
However, without clear articulation of what sets a flagrant violation
apart from a non-flagrant violation in the context of police
misconduct, lower courts have no guidance regarding what behavior
the Court aims to deter by applying the exclusionary rule.16 Further,
as Justice Kagan explained in her dissent in Utah v. Strieff, the result
of the majority’s ruling implies that “[t]he officer’s incentive to violate
the Constitution thus increases: From here on, he sees potential
advantage in stopping individuals without reasonable suspicion—
exactly the temptation the exclusionary rule is supposed to remove.”17

8. Id. at 2064.
9. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19 (1990) (recognizing rule); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486–87 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338,
341 (1939).
10. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975).
11. Id. at 604.
12. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016).
13. Erwin Chemerinsky, Has the Supreme Court Dealt a Blow to the Fourth
Amendment?, ABA J. (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
chemerinsky_has_the_supreme_court_dealt_a_blow_to_the_fourth_amendment
[https://perma.cc/ZGB8-C4L8].
14. See generally Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011).
15. Id. at 238 (2011) (“In a line of cases beginning with United States v.
Leon . . . we also recalibrated our cost-benefit analysis in exclusion cases to focus the
inquiry on the flagrancy of the police misconduct at issue.” (internal quotations
omitted)).
16. Chemerinsky, supra note 13.
17. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2074 (Kagan, J. dissenting).
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Accordingly, even though this case “has received little public
attention . . . [it] carries enormous implications” regarding the future
of the exclusionary rule.18
Part I of this Note will illustrate how the Supreme Court has failed
to explicitly define flagrancy in the context of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Part II will demonstrate how the lower courts have
grappled with such lack of a definition. Part III will define flagrancy
as an objective measure: an officer’s illegal conduct is flagrant when it
violates clearly established case law.
I. A FAILURE TO DEFINE FLAGRANCY
The Supreme Court has not clearly articulated what kind of police
conduct is flagrant in the context of the Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule.19 The term most prominently appears in one of the
exclusionary rule’s exceptions known as the attenuation doctrine.
Under this doctrine, evidence obtained illegally may be admissible if
the prosecution can show that the connection between the illegal
police behavior and the challenged evidence has “become so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint” of the illegality.20 In assessing
such connection, the Court evaluates three factors—temporal
proximity between the illegal conduct and acquisition of evidence,
any intermediate circumstances between the illegal conduct and
acquisition of evidence, and the “purpose and flagrancy” of the
official misconduct. This Note focuses on the purpose and flagrancy
factor of the attenuation exception. However, the analysis of this
factor has been influenced by another exception to the exclusionary
rule known as the good faith exception.
Section I.A will formally introduce the exclusionary rule and give
an overview of each exception to the rule—good faith, independent
source, inevitable discovery, and attenuation. Section I.B will discuss
issues presented by Herring v. United States, a Supreme Court case
premised on the good faith exception. Language from this case has
since been used to alter the Court’s analysis of the attenuation
exception’s “purpose and flagrancy” factor. Section I.C will introduce
the Court’s most recent application of the attenuation exception—

18. Julian A. Cook III, The Wrong Decision at the Wrong Time: Utah v. Strieff in
the Era of Aggressive Policing, 70 SMU L. Rev. 293, 293 (2017).
19. Chemerinsky, supra note 13 (“The impact of the decision ultimately will
depend on how lower courts apply it and how police react to it. As to the former,
courts will need to face the question of what it means for police conduct to be
‘flagrant.’”).
20. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
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Utah v. Strieff—and explore scholars’ concerns with this case’s
implications for the exclusionary rule in general.

A. Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence
The Fourth Amendment aims to protect individuals against
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.21 A police
officer who stops, searches, or arrests someone without the proper
justification violates that constitutional protection.22 To remedy such
violations, the Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule.23
Under this rule, evidence of an individual’s guilt that is found as a
result of a Fourth Amendment violation—such as an unjustified
search or arrest—cannot be used against that person at trial.24 The
rule applies both to the direct products of an officer’s illegal act, but
also to secondary evidence, which is considered “fruit of the
poisonous tree.”25
The main rationale underlying the exclusionary rule is that it aims
to “deter [violations]—to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the
incentive to disregard it.”26 The Court has recently stated, “the
exclusionary rule has never been applied except where its deterrence
benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.”27 Accordingly, the
Court has delineated four exceptions in which the social costs of the
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”).
22. See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67 (1968) (holding that an officer
violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by stopping him based solely on
witnessing defendant talk to narcotics addicts).
23. See generally Weeks v. United States, U.S. 383 (1914) (mandating application
of exclusionary rule to federal trials); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (mandating
that the exclusionary rule applies to the states).
24. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
25. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
26. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217
(1960)); see also Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217 (“The rule is calculated to prevent, not to
repair.”). The Supreme Court had previously articulated two reasons for application
of the exclusionary rule—one reason was deterrence, and the other was to promote
judicial integrity by preventing judges from acting as “accomplices in
the . . . disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold.” Id. at 223.
However, since Mapp was decided, the Court has abandoned the judicial integrity
rationale. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984) (“First, the
exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the
errors of judges and magistrates.”).
27. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (internal quotations omitted).
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rule outweigh the potential deterrence benefits. The first is the good
faith exception, which is currently premised on analysis of police
culpability.28
The remaining three exceptions are causation
limitations to the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. The general
premise of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is that secondary
evidence—anything discovered as a result of illegally obtained
primary evidence—is also inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.29
The three exceptions to this doctrine arise in situations in which the
government can prove that secondary or derivative evidence is far
enough removed from the initial illegality that it is not causally tied to
the illegal police conduct. These fruit of the poisonous tree
exceptions are referred to as the independent source exception, the
inevitable discovery exception, and the attenuation exception. The
following subsections provide an overview of the four limitations.

1.

Culpability Limitation: Good Faith

Originally, the Court established the “good faith” exception in
In Leon, the Court held that evidence
obtained pursuant to a search warrant that is later declared to be
invalid may be introduced at a defendant’s criminal trial, if a
reasonably well-trained officer would have believed the warrant was
valid.31 This standard was entirely objective.32 In Leon, police
officers executed a facially valid search warrant that led to the
discovery of evidence, but the warrant was subsequently declared
invalid due to judicial error.33 While the district court initially
suppressed the evidence because it was obtained based on a faulty
warrant, the Supreme Court reasoned that suppression would not
serve any law enforcement deterrent purpose because the mistake

United States v. Leon.30

28. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (“To trigger the
exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can
meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price
paid by the justice system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to
deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances
recurring or systemic negligence.”).
29. See generally United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980).
30. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
31. Id. at 922.
32. An objective standard does not consider the subjective state of mind of the
officer. Rather, all actions are compared to what a reasonably well-trained officer
would have done in similar circumstances. Id.
33. Id. at 902 (“A facially valid search warrant was issued in September 1981 by a
State Superior Court Judge.”).
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was on the part of the judge, not an officer.34 The Court ruled that
the officers’ reliance on the warrant was reasonable, and that any
other reasonably trained officer would have acted similarly.35
Accordingly, the benefits of deterrence under these circumstances
were not significant enough to warrant exclusion.
In 2009, however, Chief Justice John Roberts controversially
altered this objective analysis of the good faith exception by defining
the standard in terms of officer culpability.36 In Herring v. United
States,37 Chief Justice Roberts declared that the exclusionary rule
only serves to deter “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.
The error in this case does not rise to that level [of culpability].”38
Officers obtained evidence during a search incident to an arrest made
pursuant to a warrant in the defendant’s name that appeared in a
computer database.39 This database was later found to be incorrect
due to a negligent error made by a member of the neighboring
county’s sheriff’s department.40 Accordingly, the Court had to
address the novel issue of whether a negligent error by law
enforcement, rather than a court employee,41 judge,42 or legislature,43
would change the outcome of the good faith exception. Ultimately,
the substantive outcome was the same. The evidence was admissible
under the good faith exception. However, the reasoning was entirely
different: rather than analyzing the reasonableness of the officers’
action in relying on the computer database, Roberts reasoned that the
neighboring sheriff’s department’s negligent error did not rise to the
34. Id. at 921 (“Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his
own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment
violations.”).
35. Id. at 922 (“We conclude that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced
by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a
subsequently invalidated warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.”);
see also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 360 (1987) (holding that an officer’s illegal
search was made in good faith because the officer’s belief that his conduct was lawful
was objectively reasonable, given that the statute he acted under was not declared
unconstitutional until the next day).
36. Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or A Shark?,
7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 483–84 (2009) (“Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in
Herring sent objective and subjective pronouncements flying in all directions.”).
37. 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 137.
40. Id. (“There had, however, been a mistake about the warrant.”).
41. See generally Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 4 (1995).
42. See generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
43. See generally Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
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level of culpability required to warrant suppression.44 As will be
discussed in Section I.B, this new standard created concerns for the
exclusionary rule’s future.

2.

Causation Limitation: Independent Source

The first causation limitation to the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine is the independent source exception. This exception permits
the admission of illegally obtained evidence if the government can
prove the evidence could have been obtained through an independent
source.45 This exception applies both when the challenged evidence is
discovered for the first time during lawful police activity and when the
challenged evidence is initially discovered unlawfully, but is later
obtained lawfully in a manner independent of the original discovery.46
The Court justifies this exception by reasoning that while the police
should not profit from their own misconduct, they also should not be
made worse off than they were before they committed the
misconduct.47
For example, in Murray v. United States,48 the independent source
exception allowed evidence discovered during an illegal entry to be
admitted because the officers subsequently obtained a legal warrant
justifying the entry.49 The officers witnessed the defendant, who was
already under federal surveillance, and a co-conspirator drive
separately to a warehouse.50 The officers entered the warehouse
illegally, without a warrant, and observed bales of marijuana inside.51
Normally, this evidence would be suppressed under the exclusionary
rule, because even though they had probable cause, they entered the

44. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 145–46. Further, Roberts reasoned that “[i]f the
police ha[d] been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system, or to have
knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests, exclusion
would certainly be justified.” Id. at 146.
45. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
46. See generally Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
47. Id. at 541–42; Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984) (“[T]he interest of
society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries
receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police
in the same, not a worse position that they would have been in if not police error or
misconduct occurred.”).
48. 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
49. Id. at 542.
50. Id. at 535.
51. Id.
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warehouse without a warrant.52 However, subsequent to the illegal
entry, the officers left, obtained a valid warrant based on probable
cause independent of what they had seen inside the warehouse, and
then seized the bales of marijuana.53 The Court applied the
independent source exception, reasoning that even though the bales
of marijuana were first observed during the illegal entry, they also
would have been observed had the officers not entered illegally and
only entered with the valid warrant.54 The warrant served as an
“independent source.”55

3.

Causation Limitation: Inevitable Discovery

The second causation limitation to the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine is the inevitable discovery exception. Under this exception,
evidence illegally obtained may still be admissible if the prosecution
can prove such evidence would have been discovered through lawful
means had the illegal conduct never occurred.56 The logic behind this
exception is similar to the logic behind the independent source
exception, in that the courts do not want to put the prosecution in a
worse position than it otherwise would be had the police’s illegal
conduct never occurred.57
52. See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (holding that unreasonable
detention, fingerprinting, and interrogation at police headquarters should result in
application of exclusionary rule in rape case).
53. Murray, 487 U.S. at 536.
54. Id. at 541–42.
55. See generally id.
56. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440–50 (1984).
57. Murray, 487 U.S. at 539. (“The inevitable discovery doctrine, with its distinct
requirements, is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine:
Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an
independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been
discovered.”). This exception was actually established in the context of a Sixth
Amendment violation. See generally Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). In Nix,
officers deliberately violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
elicited incriminating information from him, and induced him to lead them to the
body of the murder victim. Id. at 431–33. Even though the violation was a Sixth
Amendment violation, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies in the same
manner as it does to Fourth Amendment violations—the body of the murder victim
was found as the result of the information obtained during the illegal interrogation—
the poisonous tree—and would typically be excluded as tainted fruit. Id. However, as
the defendant agreed to lead the police to the body, a separate search team, based on
information completely independent from what was gathered during the illegal
interrogation, was within a few miles from the scene. The team was called off after
the defendant cooperated. Id. The Court applied the inevitable discovery exception
to the body because it would have been discovered “within a short time” “in
essentially the same condition” as a result of the completely independent search,
based on separately gained information. Id. Accordingly, similar to the reasoning of
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For example, in United States v. Zapata,58 the police illegally
searched the defendant’s automobile and found cocaine in the
trunk.59 The First Circuit ruled that because the car was unregistered
and uninsured, it would have been impounded, and the cocaine would
have been discovered anyway during an inventory search after
impounding.60 Thus, suppressing the cocaine evidence would have
put the government in a worse position than they otherwise would
have been had the illegal search not occurred.61

4.

Causation Limitation: Attenuation

The final causation limitation to the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine is the attenuation exception. In Nardone v. United States,62
the Court held that evidence secured as the result of police illegality is
admissible when the causal connection between the illegal conduct
and the evidence has “become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint”
from the original illegal search or seizure.63 The rationale is that
when the “taint” of the illegal search or seizure is far enough removed
from the acquisition of evidence, suppression would not likely deter
future violations of the same type.64
In Brown v. Illinois,65 the Court articulated a multi-factor
framework to evaluate whether this exception applies. The first
factor examines how much time passed between the officer’s initial
illegal conduct and the acquisition of the evidence.66 Generally, when
little time passes between the illegal act and acquisition of evidence,
this factor cuts against attenuation.67 The second factor considers
whether an intermediate circumstance occurred between the initial

the independent source exception, suppressing the corpse would have put the
government in a worse place than they otherwise would have been in had the illegal
interrogation not occurred. Id.
58. 18 F.3d 971 (1st Cir. 1994).
59. Id. at 974.
60. Id. at 978.
61. Id. at 979 n.7.
62. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
63. Id. at 341.
64. Mosby v. Senkowski, 470 F.3d 515, 521 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that when
the causal link between the illegality and subsequently discovered evidence is so long
or torturous that suppressing the evidence would not deter future similar violations,
the evidence will be admissible under attenuation).
65. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
66. Id. at 603.
67. See, e.g., Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (2016) (“Our precedents have
declined to find that this factor favors attenuation unless ‘substantial time’ elapses
between an unlawful act and when the evidence is obtained.”).
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illegality and ultimate discovery of evidence, and whether such
circumstance was significant enough to attenuate the causal
relationship between the illegality and evidence.68 When the Court
finds such intervening circumstances to be present, this factor weighs
strongly against suppression.69 The third factor—the purpose and
flagrancy of the police misconduct—is most closely tied to the
ultimate purpose of the exclusionary rule, to deter police
misconduct.70
In Brown, the Court applied these three factors to address whether
confessions obtained after an illegal search and arrest were
sufficiently attenuated from the search and arrest.71 Without
probable cause, the defendant’s home was illegally entered and
searched, and the defendant was arrested.72 He was taken to the
station and given Miranda warnings.73 He confessed to murder.74
About seven hours later, he was given Miranda warnings again, and
he gave a second confession.75
The Court analyzed the first two factors in one sentence: “Brown’s
first statement was separated from his illegal arrest by less than two
hours, and there was no intervening event of significance
whatsoever.”76 However, in analyzing the third factor—the purpose
and flagrancy of the official misconduct—the Court dedicated a whole
paragraph:
The illegality here, moreover, had a quality of purposefulness. The
imporpriety [sic] of the arrest was obvious; awareness of that fact
was virtually conceded by the two detectives when they repeatedly
acknowledged, in their testimony, that the purpose of their action
was “for investigation” or for “questioning.” The arrest, both in
design and in execution, was investigatory.
The detectives
embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that
something might turn up. The manner in which Brown’s arrest was

68. Id.
69. See, e.g., id. at 2062–63.
70. See id. at 2063 (“The exclusionary rule exists to deter police
misconduct . . . The third factor of the attenuation doctrine reflects that rationale by
favoring exclusion only when the police misconduct is most in need of deterrence—
that is, when it is purposeful or flagrant.”) (internal citation omitted).
71. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604–05 (1975).
72. Id. at 592.
73. Id. at 594.
74. Id. at 594–95.
75. Id. at 595.
76. Id. at 604.

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

810

[Vol. XLV

affected gives the appearance of having been calculated to cause
surprise, fright, and confusion.77

Accordingly, the Court concluded that because these officers
effected a warrantless arrest without probable cause despite knowing
they had no legal basis to do so, such conduct constituted the type of
purposeful and flagrant conduct the exclusionary rule was meant to
deter.78 In conjunction with the short temporal proximity and the
lack of intervening circumstances between the illegal arrest and first
confession, the Court decided that the first confession was not
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest, and because the second
confession “was clearly the result and the fruit of the first,” the Court
found it inadmissible.79 However, as the next sections explore, the
“purpose and flagrancy” factor has not been treated consistently by
the courts.
B.

A Prelude to Strieff: The Problems Caused by the Herring
Opinion

Although the new culpability standard announced by Chief Justice
Roberts in Herring v. United States was intended to evaluate good
faith,80 this standard has since been applied by the lower courts in the
context of attenuation cases.81 An understanding of the general
problems created by both Herring’s new culpability standard and the
opinion’s language is necessary before exploring how this standard
has been applied to the attenuation exception. This section thus
outlines concerns scholars have raised regarding the precedent set by
the Herring opinion.

1.

Contradicts Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence

Scholars comment that the culpability standard requiring
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent misconduct for the
exclusionary rule to apply finds no support in Fourth Amendment
case law because this standard now requires courts to consider the

Id. at 605 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 605.
Id. at 604–05.
See supra Section I.A.1.
See infra Part II; see also Joëlle Anne Moreno, Flagrant Police Abuse: Why
Black Lives (Also) Matter to the Fourth Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 36,
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

68 (2016) (explaining how the Court has mapped its flagrant police abuse standard
from Herring to the attenuation exception).
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subjective mental states of police officers.82 However, the Supreme
Court has specifically stated that courts should not probe the minds of
police officers.83 The Leon Court “predicted that requiring proof of
actual (rather than reasonable) police bad faith . . . would ‘send state
and federal courts on an expedition into the minds of police officers
[and] would produce a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial
resources.’”84 Accordingly, the Leon Court cautioned that the “goodfaith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question
whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the
search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.”85
However, as Professor Albert Alschuler notes, despite quoting
Leon’s objective standard and claiming it was applying the same
deterrence analysis, the Herring Court’s use of the words “reckless”
and “deliberate” suggests subjective inquiries based on a particular
police officer’s state of mind rather than on Leon’s ‘reasonably well
trained officer’ standard.86 Further, Justice Ginsburg highlights this
contradiction in her dissent in Herring, stating that “[i]t is not clear
how the Court squares its focus on deliberate conduct with its
recognition that application of the exclusionary rule does not require
inquiry into the mental state of the police.”87

2.

Undefined Terms

Second, some scholars acknowledge that the terms used in the new
culpability standard for the good faith exception remain undefined in
the context of the Fourth Amendment. For example, the term
recklessness “establishes an objective standard in civil cases and a

82. Wayne R. Lafave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s
Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 763
(2009) (“But where does the Herring Court find this “culpability” test for

determining the scope of the exclusionary rule? It is set out as if a foregone
conclusion, and is immediately followed with quotations from Leon and Krull,
suggesting that the notion is well-grounded in existing jurisprudence on the
exclusionary rule.”).
83. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).
84. Joëlle Anne Moreno, Rights, Remedies, and the Quantum and Burden of
Proof, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 89, 152–53 (2015); see also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355
(1987) (“As we emphasized in Leon, the standard of reasonableness we adopt is an
objective one; the standard does not turn on the subjective good faith of individual
officers.”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919–20 n.20 (1984).
85. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23.
86. Alschuler, supra note 36, at 485–86.
87. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 157 n.7 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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subjective standard in criminal cases,” but it is not clear which
interpretation of recklessness applies in Herring’s culpability
standard.88 Similarly, as Professor Wayne LaFave notes, the term
“gross negligence” is an elusive term that has “left the finest scholars
puzzled.”89 Further, the Court has never used the term “systemic
negligence” before.90
Professor Joëlle Moreno argues that the Herring opinion also
implicitly gave new meaning to the term “flagrancy.”91 She notes that
in Herring, the Court stated that “an assessment of the flagrancy of
the police misconduct constitutes an important step in the [exclusion]
calculus” under the good faith doctrine.92 Two years after Herring,
the Court in Davis v. United States 93 adopted this rationale in
another case premised on the good faith exception. The Court held
that suppression in the context of good faith “focus[es] the inquiry on
the flagrancy of the police misconduct at issue.”94 Moreno believes
that in Herring, Chief Justice Roberts improperly conflated flagrant
misconduct with intentional or mentally culpable misconduct.95

3.

New Procedural Impracticalities

Professor Andrew Ferguson argues that replacing the good faith
standard with this new subjective culpability standard creates new
issues to consider for courtroom litigation.96 For example, focusing

88. Alschuler, supra note 36, at 486.
89. Lafave, supra note 82, at 784 (“The Court has acknowledged that the term
“gross negligence” can often equate to recklessness. However, because “gross
negligence” “is used in Herring to fill out a list into which the term “reckless” had
already been placed, presumably the term is not being used merely as a synonym for
recklessness.”); see also supra Section I.A.1.
90. Id. at 784–85 (“[I]t presumably refers to a variety of negligence that has an
effect upon an entire recordkeeping system . . . [b]ut just what is necessary to show
what the Court referred to as ‘systemic error’ at another point in Herring is far from
clear.”).
91. Moreno, supra note 81, at 49 (“Starting with Herring, a majority of the Court
transformed the operative constitutional language by inserting a single ambiguous
word into the new suppression standard.”).
92. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009).
93. 564 U.S. 229 (2011).
94. Id. at 238.
95. Moreno, supra note 81, at 51 (“Starting with Herring, the Court has
repeatedly used the word flagrant when it actually means intentional or mentally
culpable.”).
96. See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Constitutional Culpability:
Questioning the New Exclusionary Rules, 66 FLA. L. REV. 623 (2014) (addressing the
various issues presented by the Supreme Court’s recent Fourth Amendment
decisions).
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on an officer’s subjective knowledge may give the prosecution an
additional opportunity to bolster its case by allowing the officer to
testify as to his subjective reasoning.97 Allowing an officer to testify
as to his subjective belief for why he thought his actions were
constitutional may sway the Court to focus too much on subjective
considerations that the defense cannot contradict.98
Another problem potentially created is that prior experience of the
officer now becomes relevant under this new standard.99 Previously,
“past experience was irrelevant to whether the officer acted within
constitutional restraints.”100 However, as Ferguson notes, under the
new culpability standard, “[i]f an officer had been disciplined because
of prior inattention to constitutional restraints, this fact would bear on
the nature of the constitutional wrong . . . [a]s might be imagined, this
history of prior conduct will present a real difficulty for courts in
terms of time, expense, and confusion.”101
Finally, using a subjective culpability standard may increase the
defendant’s burden of proof in the context of the good faith
exception.102
As Professor Kay Levine notes, “[e]vidence of
malicious or reckless intent is often hard to come by, especially when
officers are testifying under oath.”103 This new burden of proof
requirement will likely lead to many fewer applications of the
exclusionary rule at suppression hearings.104
97. Id. at 671.
98. Id. at 673 (“Showing a pattern of constitutional practice may counteract the
defense’s attempt to show a pattern of violations.”).
99. Id. at 671.
100. Id. at 673.
101. Id.
102. United States v. De La Torre, 543 F. App’x 827, 830 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding
that despite defendant’s proof of overbroad search warrant, good faith exception
applies unless defendant also proved the overbroad warrant resulted from a ‘flagrant
or deliberate’ violation of rights under Herring); United States v. Guerrero, 500 F.
App’x 263, 264–65 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that evidence seized pursuant to facially
invalid warrant is admissible based on Herring because defendant could not prove
the officer’s conduct was sufficiently culpable).
103. Kay L. Levine et al., Evidence Laundering in a Post-Herring World,
106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 627, 644 (2016); see also Herring v. United States,
555 U.S. 135, 157 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“How is an impecunious
defendant to make the required showing?”).
104. Tom Goldstein, The Surpassing Significance of Herring, SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan. 14, 2009), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/the-surpassing-significance-of-herring/
[https://perma.cc/67ZM-FGN7] (“[T]he Supreme Court today extended the good
faith exception to ordinary police conduct.”) (“If Herring comes to be cited for the
proposition that the defendant must affirmatively prove that the officer was reckless
rather than merely negligent, then the exclusionary rule will apply much, much more
rarely than it does today.”).
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Unclear Implications for Attenuation

Scholars also comment on the unprecedented use of the word
“attenuated” in the Herring opinion.105 The Court used language
three different times that suggested that its holding might be relevant
to a completely separate exception to the exclusionary rule—the
attenuation exception. First, the Court stated that “the error was the
result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest . . . [and] that
in these circumstances the jury should not be barred from considering
all the evidence.”106 Second, in describing the Eleventh Circuit’s
ruling, the Court then stated that “[b]ecause the error was merely
negligent and attenuated from the arrest, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the benefit of suppressing the evidence ‘would be
marginal or nonexistent . . . .’”107 Finally, the Court concluded that
“[a]n error that arises from nonrecurring and attenuated negligence
is . . . far removed from the core concerns that led us to adopt the
rule . . . .”108
The Court never explained why it used the word attenuated at
all.109
As Alschuler demonstrates, according to the meaning
attenuation has had over the last seventy years, “attenuation” had no
place in the Herring opinion:
The negligence of the Dale County clerk in Herring was plainly both
a but-for and a proximate cause of the defendant’s unlawful
arrest. . . . Nothing whatsoever had happened to “dissipate” or
“attenuate” his error. Although the clerk’s error occurred five
months before Herring’s arrest, the passage of time certainly did not
“dissipate the taint” or break the causal chain. To the contrary,
Dale County’s failure to check its electronic record against its paper
record during the five-month period might have been regarded as
aggravating the initial wrong.110

Accordingly, scholars remain puzzled as to what the Court meant by
“attenuated” in the Herring opinion.111 However, as the next section
demonstrates, cases focused on the attenuation exception have begun
to use language from Herring’s good faith analysis.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Alschuler, supra note 36, at 478–81.
Herring, 555 U.S. at 137.
Id. at 138–39.
Id. at 144.
Alschuler, supra note 36, at 478–79.
Id. at 479.
Lafave, supra note 82, at 771–76.
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Herring’s Lasting Impact: Utah v. Strieff and the Current State

of the Attenuation Exception’s Purpose and Flagrancy Factor

Despite the concerns outlined by scholars in the previous section,
the Court has continued to rely upon Herring’s controversial
culpability analysis.112
Specifically, the culpability analysis,
established in the context of the good faith exception, has been used
to evaluate the purpose and flagrancy factor of the attenuation
exception in Utah v. Strieff.113 Section I.C.1 reviews the facts and
decision of Utah v. Strieff. Section I.C.2 discusses the dissent’s
concern that Strieff incentivizes officers to commit illegality.
Section I.C.3 explains scholars’ concern that equating flagrancy with
Herring’s culpability standard overly burdens the defendant.

1.

Utah v. Strieff: Facts and Majority Opinion

In Utah v. Strieff, the Court held that an illegal stop was
sufficiently attenuated from drug evidence later found on the
defendant, Edward Strieff.114 In this case, Officer Fackrell had been
intermittently surveilling a house he suspected of drug activity based
on an anonymous tip.115 During his surveillance, he observed Edward
Strieff exiting this house, but he did not know when he entered the
building or how long he had been there.116 Officer Fackrell stopped
Strieff—illegally, since he did not possess the requisite reasonable
suspicion117—and demanded identification information, which led
him to discover an outstanding arrest warrant for an unrelated traffic
violation.118 Based on the warrant, Officer Fackrell arrested Strieff
Officer Fackrell
and searched him incident to the arrest.119
discovered drug evidence against Strieff during this search.120
To determine whether the evidence was properly admitted at trial,
the Court applied the three Brown attenuation factors.121 It first

112. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 240–41 (2011).
113. Moreno, supra note 81, at 68 (“The assessment of flagrancy [in Strieff ] was a
not-so-subtle attempt to map the current Court’s flagrant police abuse suppression
standard onto preexisting attenuation doctrine.”).
114. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2060 (2016).
115. Id. at 2059.
116. Id. at 2060.
117. Id. at 2062 (ruling that the information possessed by Officer Fackrell did not
rise to the level of reasonable suspicion).
118. Id. at 2060.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2062.
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declared that the temporal proximity factor favored suppression
because the time between the illegal stop and discovery of evidence
was only a few minutes.122 Second, it deemed the outstanding
warrant an intervening circumstance, which would weigh in favor of
admission.123 Third, and most significantly, when analyzing the
purpose and flagrancy factor, the Court implicated Herring’s good
faith analysis.124
Instead of assessing the obviousness of the impropriety as was done
in Brown,125 the Court asked whether Fackrell’s mistakes were more
than negligent, like in Herring.126 The Court answered by concluding
that Officer Fackrell’s decision to unlawfully stop Strieff was a “goodfaith mistake” that was “at most negligent.”127 However, the Court
never explained why it believed a “good faith” determination was
appropriate in the context of attenuation’s purpose and flagrancy
factor. Further, the Court stated that “it is especially significant that
there is no evidence that Officer Fackrell’s illegal stop reflected
flagrantly unlawful police misconduct.”128 Ultimately, the Court
found that the evidence was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal
stop and thus deemed it admissible.129

2.

The Dissents: Strieff Provides Incentive to Commit Misconduct

Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan wrote separately in dissent,
but both argued that the outcome of Strieff provides police with
further incentive to commit Fourth Amendment violations.130 Justice
Sotomayor argued that based on this decision, as long as an
outstanding warrant exists, the illegality of a search makes no
difference.131 She specifically discussed how “surprisingly common”
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2062–63.
124. Id. at 2063; see also Goldstein, supra note 104 (“[T]he Supreme Court today
extended the good faith exception to ordinary police conduct.”). But see Alschuler,
supra note 36, at 473 (“First, creating a general good faith exception for police
conduct would be an extraordinary shift in Fourth Amendment law that would
effectively overrule a ton of cases” (internal quotations omitted)).
125. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975) (“The impropriety of the arrest was
obvious . . . ”).
126. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016).
127. Id. at 2063.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2064.
130. See id. at 2065–66 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); id. at 2073–74 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Kagan was joined by Justice Ginsburg. Justice Sotomayor was
joined by Justice Ginsburg as to all but Part IV of the opinion.
131. See id. at 2067 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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outstanding arrest warrants are, and “how these astounding numbers
of warrants can be used by police to stop people without cause.”132
Quite powerfully, she opined that “this case tells everyone, white and
black, guilty and innocent . . . that your body is subject to invasion
while courts excuse the violation of your rights.”133
Justice Kagan similarly objected that this outcome incentivizes
police to commit illegal stops.134 She argued that applying the
exclusionary rule to the facts of Strieff would have resulted in
sufficient deterrence benefits.135 She reasoned that an officer who
believes any evidence he discovers illegally will be inadmissible “is
likely to think the unlawful stop [is] not worth making.”136 She
further commented that such effect is “precisely the deterrence the
exclusionary rule is meant to achieve.”137 The outcome of the Strieff
decision removes the deterrent benefit of the exclusionary rule as
long as an outstanding warrant exists:
So long as the target is one of the many millions of people in this
country with an outstanding arrest warrant, anything the officer
finds in a search is fair game for use in a criminal prosecution. The
officer’s incentive to violate the Constitution thus increases: From
here on, he sees potential advantage in stopping individuals without
reasonable suspicion—exactly the temptation the exclusionary rule
is supposed to remove.138

These justices ultimately believe that conduct like Officer
Fackrell’s should be dis-incentivized. However, as Justice Sotomayor
notes, the officer’s incentive to violate the law will remain so long as
the burden of proof remains on the defendant to prove an officer’s
subjective culpability.139

3.

Increased Burden of Proof Turns on Flagrancy’s Definition

Scholars predicted that the Herring culpability standard would
ultimately result in fewer applications of the exclusionary rule
because the defendant will have an increased burden to prove that an
officer acted with the required subjective culpability level.140

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2070.
See id. at 2074 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2071–72.
Id. at 2073.
Id. at 2073–74.
Id. at 2074.
See id. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Goldstein, supra note 104.
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According to Moreno, the outcome of Strieff confirms this prediction,
in the context of the attenuation exception.141
The Strieff Court held that “it [was] especially significant that there
[was] no evidence that Officer Fackrell’s illegal stop reflected
flagrantly unlawful police conduct.”142 The Court, significantly,
rejected Strieff’s argument that Officer Fackrell was flagrant by
concluding that his behavior “was not a suspicionless fishing
expedition ‘in the hopes that something would turn up.’”143 Moreno
argues that the facts of Strieff do not support such a conclusion.144
Moreno points out that Fackrell candidly admitted that he lacked
sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop Strieff.145
Considering
Fackrell’s other admission, that he wanted to “find out what was
going on [in] the house,”146 the fact that he did not wait to develop
reasonable suspicion for a lawful stop suggests to Moreno that “[t]he
evidence, on its face, cannot support a finding of mere negligence.”147
Still, Strieff was unable to convince the Court that Fackrell acted
flagrantly.
Moreno argued that the Court’s treatment of flagrancy in this case
equates flagrant conduct with intentional or reckless conduct, just like
in Herring.148 She believes that Strieff’s treatment of the word
flagrancy puts an unfair burden on the defense to prove the officer’s
subjective culpability because “[w]hen flagrancy is defined as a
hidden mental state it becomes unknowable.”149 She acknowledges
that proof of subjective culpability is an acceptable burden for the
prosecution to bear when trying to overcome the presumption of
innocence in a criminal case.150 However, she argues that applying
this same “insurmountable burden” to defendants in the context of a
suppression hearing is inappropriate:
Searches and seizures are rarely witnessed events, police officers
characteristically do not disclose to suspects their intent to violate
the constitution, and police officers who witness illegal police
conduct are unlikely to be cooperative and forthcoming. Thus,
defendants typically must rely on their own first-hand eyewitness
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See Moreno, supra note 81, at 46–48.
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063.
Id. at 2064 (quoting Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691 (1982)).
Moreno, supra note 81, at 69.
Id.
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2072.
Moreno, supra note 81, at 69.
Id. at 41–42.
Id. at 51.
See id. at 55.
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accounts of police misconduct, which are necessarily self-serving and
may also be incomplete or poorly-recalled.151

II. LOWER COURT PURPOSE AND FLAGRANCY FACTORS
Given the issues presented by scholars in the above part, a new
standard for “flagrancy” must be developed. Much like the Supreme
Court shows in Utah v. Strieff, lower courts’ decisions demonstrate
confusion about how flagrancy is to be defined in the Fourth
Amendment context. No formal analysis of different interpretations
of the purpose and flagrancy factor exists in scholarly writing.
Accordingly, this section attempts to distinguish three different trends
of how the purpose and flagrancy factor has been interpreted within
the attenuation context since Herring. Each case discussed represents
a different trend or variation of a trend.
The courts have treated flagrancy in three general ways.
Section II.A discusses two cases that expressly equate flagrancy with
subjective intent. Section II.B discusses a case that defines flagrancy
as both an objective and subjective inquiry. Section II.C explores
three cases that utilize an objective definition for flagrancy, but still
consider the officer’s subjective intent as a separate “purpose”
component.
A. Flagrancy Equated to Subjective Intent
Some courts completely abandon the objective approach and
evaluate the “purpose and flagrancy” factor of the attenuation
exception based on the officer’s subjective culpability. These courts
treat purpose and flagrancy as equivalent, interchangeable concepts
that depend on the subjective intent of the officer.152 They also tend
to require the highest levels of mens rea culpability—deliberate or
intentional—for the final attenuation factor to weigh in favor of
suppression.
This approach poses the highest evidentiary hurdle for
defendants.153 Fourth Amendment case law has historically rejected
analysis of an officer’s subjective intent, so prosecutors do not ask
officers questions about their subjective beliefs on direct examination
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Shetler, 665 F.3d 1150, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding
that an officer acts with the requisite intent when he “purposely extracts evidence” or
acts with “flagrant illegality” (citing United States v. Washington, 387 F.3d 1060, 1075
n.17 (9th Cir. 2004)).
153. See Moreno, supra note 81, at 69 (noting that proof of intentional or mentally
culpable police misconduct constitutes a “virtually insurmountable burden of proof”).
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at a suppression hearing.154 Therefore, while it is theoretically the
government’s burden to prove attenuation, in practice, the defendant
often ends up bearing the burden of proof.155 Thus, a defendant
needs to develop a record with evidence pertaining to officer intent
through cross examination.156 However, this burden is heavy,
particularly at the highest level of mens rea culpability.157 An officer
will rarely admit that his intent was to violate the law or that it was
improper, and most courts presume that an officer does not possess
the required culpable intent unless otherwise proven.158 Thus, these
courts most frequently find in favor of attenuation.
For example, in United States v. Belt,159 the Fourth Circuit held
that the state troopers’ intent was not flagrant because the
circumstances were not coercive enough to convince the court the
officers had an improper purpose.160 Based on a tip that the
defendant was making methamphetamines, troopers headed to his
home intending to conduct a knock-and-talk.161 Instead, when they
arrived, they noticed the defendant’s eleven-year-old son outside and
followed him into the defendant’s home; this conduct constituted an
illegal entry because the defendant did not consent to their entry.162
Once inside, one trooper asked the defendant for consent to search
his home, but he refused and said they would need a warrant.163
Troopers continued questioning him and asked what was worrying
him.164 The defendant answered that there were “two jars upstairs

154. See Orin Kerr, Opinion Analysis: The Exclusionary Rule Is Weakened but It
Still Lives, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2016, 9:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/

2016/06/opinion-analysis-the-exclusionary-rule-is-weakened-but-it-still-lives/
[https://perma.cc/W8JU-84JK] (noting that although the government bears the
burden of establishing attenuation, the Court has made clear officer’s intent is
completely irrelevant to Fourth Amendment violations in recent decades, and thus
there is usually nothing in the record relevant to officer purpose). See generally
Moreno, supra note 81.
155. See Kerr, supra note 154.
156. See id.
157. See Moreno, supra note 81, at 55.
158. See id.
159. 609 F. App’x 745 (4th Cir. 2015).
160. See id. at 750.
161. Id. Normally, the home is a constitutionally protected area. See Florida v.
Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013). However, under the knock and talk rule, an officer
may “approach a home and knock, precisely because that is ‘no more than any
private citizen may do.’” Id. at 8 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469–70
(2011)).
162. See Belt, 609 F. App’x at 747–48.
163. Id. at 747.
164. Id.
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that had been used for something” and explained the jars contained
“the stuff everyone makes.”165 Based on the information learned, one
of the troopers left and obtained a search warrant.166 Upon returning,
the troopers searched the home, and found firearms and items used to
manufacture methamphetamines.167 The Fourth Circuit held that the
discovery of the methamphetamine evidence was sufficiently
attenuated from the illegal entry, noting the troopers did not
flagrantly violate the law when entering the defendant’s home
without his consent.168
Based on the defendant’s seemingly voluntary actions and calm
demeanor, the court declined to infer that the troopers possessed any
culpable intent.169 The court openly disagreed with the troopers’
decision to follow the young son into the home instead of conducting
the knock-and-talk.170 However, the court found that because the
defendant “felt comfortable refusing consent to search the home,”
and because “the voluntary nature of the discussion between
defendant and troopers” never changed, no evidence indicated
intimidating circumstances or that the troopers possessed culpable
intent.171 Therefore, their illegal entry was not a flagrant violation of
the law that would warrant suppression, and the evidence was
properly admitted under the attenuation exception.172
However, in United States v. Shetler,173 the Ninth Circuit found
sufficient evidence to determine that the officers’ subjective intent
was specifically to find evidence against the defendant. In this case,
officers had received a tip that the defendant was making
methamphetamines.174 Officers knocked on his front door, and the
defendant exited his house and approached them from a side door.175

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 747–48.
168. Id. at 749–50.
169. Id. at 750 (“Nothing indicates the troopers acted with an improper purpose.
The troopers intended to conduct a “knock and talk” until Appellant’s son invited
them into the home, and after Appellant refused to permit the troopers to search his
home, one trooper merely asked what worried Appellant. Appellant could have
refused to answer this question. The fact that Appellant felt comfortable refusing
consent to search the home reflects an absence of intimidation in this scenario.”).
170. See id. at 750 (noting the troopers “should have proceeded with greater
caution and respect for Appellant’s privacy”).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 665 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011).
174. Id. at 1153.
175. Id. at 1154.
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Immediately, the officers handcuffed and detained him.176 The
officers called into the defendant’s house to get his girlfriend and
daughter out of the house.177 Once they exited, the officers entered
the home and conducted a search of the home.178 While the home
was already being searched, other officers asked the defendant’s
girlfriend for consent to search the house, which she eventually gave,
but only after the search had started.179 After witnessing the officers’
entry, the defendant was Mirandized and then confessed that he’d
been manufacturing methamphetamines in his garage.180
In considering the third prong of the attenuation test, the court said
the officers’ conduct was flagrant after inferring their improper
subjective intent from four circumstances.181 First, the officers never
left the house after performing the illegal search—they stayed in a
room near the entryway for about twenty-five more minutes.182
Second, they searched the house before asking the defendant’s
girlfriend for consent to enter and search their home.183 Third,
officers remained inside the house while others obtained the
girlfriend’s (tainted) consent.184 Fourth, the court assumed the
officers specifically used the items they illegally seized when
questioning the defendant.185 Accordingly, the court concluded that
the purpose of the officers’ subsequent illegal searches was
“indisputably to find evidence that could be used against the
defendant.”186 Because of this improper purpose, the officers’ actions
were determined to be flagrant, the attenuation exception did not
apply, and the defendant’s inculpatory statements were suppressed.187

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1160.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1158–60 (reasoning that because the defendant was detained outside his
home for over five hours, during which he saw several illegal searches involving
protective clothing and masks, the answers he gave were likely “influenced by his
knowledge that the officials had already seized certain evidence”).
186. Id. at 1160.
187. Id. at 1150.
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Flagrancy Depends on Objective Reasonableness and
Subjective Intent

Some courts apply both an objective standard and a subjective
standard to the purpose and flagrancy factor of the attenuation
exception. These courts use both objective and subjective standards
to define flagrancy.188 These courts first consider whether the officer
acted in “objective good faith.” Second, they consider whether the
officer had the specific intent required to justify exclusion.
For example, in McDaniel v. Polley,189 the Seventh Circuit decided
the officers’ actions were not flagrant for both objective and
subjective reasons. In this case, four officers went to the defendant’s
house in a murder investigation, knowing they did not yet have
probable cause to arrest the defendant.190 The defendant consented
to their requests to enter and to search his home.191 The defendant
then began acting nervously, so the officers cuffed him but informed
him he was not under arrest.192 After the officers uncuffed him, the
defendant agreed to the officers’ request to go to the station.193 The
defendant was then Mirandized and questioned three separate times
over twenty-four hours.194 He confessed to murder and signed a
written confession.195 The trial court concluded that the officers
unlawfully placed the defendant in custody by handcuffing him.196
However, the Seventh Circuit held that the confession was sufficiently
attenuated from the original illegal arrest, and therefore the
confession was admissible.197
In evaluating what it called the “flagrancy” factor of the
attenuation analysis,198 the Seventh Circuit made two determinations.
First, the court determined whether the officers’ mistake of arresting

188. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465 (7th Cir. 2003) (requiring a
showing of objective “bad faith” and subjective intent to commit misconduct without
probable cause in order to tip the entire final attenuation factor towards
suppression).
189. 847 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2017).
190. Id. at 891.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 892.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 897.
198. Id. at 896 (“The flagrancy of police misconduct is the most important element
of our analysis because the exclusionary rule is aimed at deterring police
misconduct.”) (citing United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 464–65 (7th Cir. 2003)).
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the defendant (when placing the cuffs on him) without probable cause
was made in good faith.199 The court said it was, because the mistake
was merely negligent.200 Second, the Seventh Circuit determined that
the officers’ subjective intent was not culpable.201 The court
suggested that the officers only would have been sufficiently culpable
if they subjectively intended to arrest the defendant when placing the
cuffs on him.202 Here, they did not.203 Therefore, based on both
objective and subjective determinations, the Seventh Circuit held that
the officers’ placement of the cuffs on the defendant was not
flagrant.204 Excluding the confession, according to the court, “would
not deter this type of conduct: officers would still have to investigate
crimes before they have probable cause and would continue to rely on
various witnesses’ and suspects’ consent when doing so.”205
C.

Flagrancy Depends on Objective Reasonableness, and Purpose
Depends on Subjective Culpability

Some courts treat flagrancy as an entirely objective consideration
based on the clarity of existing case law. These courts consider an
officer’s conduct flagrant if it violates case law that is sufficiently clear
and thus should be known by a reasonably trained officer. This
standard is objective because it does not require determining whether
the officer subjectively knows his conduct is illegal when committing
it, but rather it requires determining whether the officer should have
known it was illegal, based on how clear case law is concerning the
particular act. However, while flagrancy remains an objective
determination, the officer’s subjective intent still affects the
attenuation analysis. The “purpose” portion of the flagrancy and
purpose factor is still treated as a subjective consideration that is
analyzed separately from the flagrancy determination.206
For example, in United States v. Fuller,207 the court evaluated
“flagrancy” under an objective standard and separately analyzed
199. McDaniel, 847 F.3d at 896 (“These mistakes, if they were mistakes, constitute
negligence.”).
200. Id. at 896–97.
201. Id. at 897.
202. Id. at 896–97.
203. Id. at 897.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., United States v. Cantu, 426 F. App’x 253, 258–59 (5th Cir. 2011)
(applying an objective flagrancy factor and a separate purpose factor based on
subjective culpability).
207. 120 F. Supp. 3d 669, 682, 689 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
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“purpose” under a subjective standard. In this case, two officers—
Officers Montgomery and Corrie—stopped the defendant for
questioning, subjectively “seeking to execute an outstanding arrest
warrant” against a man that Officer Montgomery confused with the
defendant.208 Officer Montgomery realized that the defendant was
not the person he was looking for, but he continued to detain
Fuller.209 At this point, reasonable suspicion was removed.210
However, the officers illegally detained the defendant anyway to
determine whether any outstanding warrants existed in his name.211
Officer Montgomery attempted to do a pat-down search, but the
defendant refused, and eventually fled on foot.212 The officers caught
the defendant, subdued him, and discovered a loaded handgun.213
The court ruled that the discovery of the handgun was not sufficiently
attenuated from the unlawfully continued detention of the
defendant.214
First, the court stated “[t]he purposefulness factor is met when the
unlawful action is investigatory, that is, when officers unlawfully seize
a defendant ‘in the hope something might turn up.’”215 Here, the
court found that the officers possessed such intent.216 Even though
the informed officer knew that the defendant was not the man they
were looking for, he conceded that he wanted to see if there was an
outstanding warrant.217 However, Officer Montgomery had been
directly involved with the defendant’s prior criminal case, meaning
that he should have been fully aware that the defendant no longer
had any outstanding arrest warrants.218 While the court ruled it was
relevant to consider whether “the illegal conduct was calculated ‘to
cause surprise, fright, and confusion,’” it concluded that “purposeful

208. Id. at 672.
209. Id. at 674.
210. Id. at 682 (“Once Deputy Montgomery’s reasonable suspicion was dispelled,
Deputy Montgomery had no objectively reasonable basis to continue to detain
Fuller.”).
211. Id. at 675.
212. Id. at 675–76.
213. Id. at 676 (“Deputy Montgomery then conducted a pat down of Fuller and
found a loaded handgun in Fuller’s back pocket.”).
214. Id. at 690.
215. Id. at 689.
216. Id. at 682.
217. Id. at 689.
218. Id. at 689–90.
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and flagrant misconduct is not limited to situations where the police
act in an outright threatening or coercive manner.”219
The court said that “[a]n officer’s conduct is flagrant if it violates
well-established legal rules.”220
The court found Officer
Montgomery’s conduct flagrant because he “violated the long-settled
rule that a police officer must end a Terry stop221 as soon as his
reasonable suspicion evaporates.”222 The court concluded that
Officer Montgomery “should have been aware that there was no
warrant outstanding” for the defendant, and he, thus, should have
communicated that to his fellow officer.223 The officers continued the
stop nonetheless. The court characterized Officer Montgomery’s
decision to continue the Terry stop as “especially reckless”224
because, given his involvement in the defendant’s previous criminal
case, he should have known that the defendant had no outstanding
arrest warrant.225 This comment emphasizes the objective nature of
the flagrancy factor because it demonstrates that the court does not
require the officer to have subjectively known that he was violating
the law. Accordingly, the officer’s continued detention of the
defendant, which he conceded was to investigate whether an
outstanding warrant existed, was flagrant.226 Therefore, in this case,
219. Id. at 689 (first quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975); and then
quoting United States v. Shaw, 464 F.3d 615, 630 (6th Cir. 2006)).
220. Id.
221. A “Terry stop” is another way to describe a regular stop. Under Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a Terry stop can be made without the usual probable cause
requirements of an arrest or search. It is only valid when it is justified by an objective
manifestation that the person stopped or about to be stopped is about to be involved
in criminal activity. See id. at 32.
222. Fuller, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 689.
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 689–90 (“[L]ong before Deputy Montgomery encountered Fuller on
Wiard Boulevard, the Prosecuting Attorney had both charged Fuller with assault and
battery and dismissed that charge. Deputy Montgomery was the officer in charge of
that case. As the officer in charge, he had a clear responsibility to keep abreast of the
proceedings. Indeed, an officer in charge is tasked with communicating with
witnesses; serving subpoenas on the witnesses; and attending certain court
proceedings. And although Deputy Montgomery claims that he has no memory of
playing any role in the Fuller case once it reached state court, there [sic] some reason
to believe that Deputy Montgomery did, in fact, serve a witness subpoena in that
case—which should have signaled to Deputy Montgomery that Fuller’s criminal case
was in process and that no warrant was outstanding. Yet Deputy Montgomery had
no idea that the charges against Fuller had been dismissed several months before he
encountered Fuller on Wiard Boulevard in October of 2014. Deputy Montgomery’s
abject failure to learn and remember the status of his own recent case led him to
violate Fuller’s Fourth Amendment rights.” (internal citations omitted)).
226. Id. at 689.
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the purpose and flagrancy factor leaned toward exclusion, and the
handgun was ruled inadmissible.227
However, the outcome of United States v. Cantu228 demonstrates
that a defendant’s failure to prove an officer’s subjective culpability
will outweigh an objective finding of flagrancy and lead to attenuation
instead of suppression. In this case, the defendant’s boyfriend gave
the officers his consent to search his car, in which the officers found a
purse.229 One officer asked the defendant if the purse belonged to
her, and she said yes.230 Despite not asking for consent, the officer
then searched her bag and found marijuana and rolling paper.231
When asked, the defendant confirmed they were hers.232 The officer
arrested her and told her she could help herself out if she knew of
narcotics in the vehicle, and she said she believed there might be.233
A canine searched the car and led the officers to find a substantial
amount of cocaine underneath the front seat.234 DEA agents were
notified and then conducted their own interrogation of the
defendant.235 At the end of the interrogation, the defendant
confessed to the cocaine in the car.236
The court first determined flagrancy based on the objective
consideration of how clear the case law was concerning these factual
circumstances.237 The court determined that the precedent laid down
by the court in United States v. Jaras,238 which held that mere
acquiescence cannot be construed as voluntary consent when officers
never asked permission, was longstanding enough that a reasonable
227. See id. at 690.
228. 426 F. App’x 253 (5th Cir. 2011).
229. Id. at 255.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 255–56.
236. Id. at 256, 258.
237. Id. at 258 (stating specifically that there was “nothing unclear about Jaras,
which has been the law of this circuit for almost [fifteen] years”).
238. 86 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996). In Jaras, police obtained consent for a search
from the driver of a vehicle, leading them to two suitcases in the trunk. Id. at 386.
The driver informed the officers that the suitcases belonged to his passenger, Jaras.
Id. The officers told Jaras that they obtained permission from the driver to search
the car. Id. They continued to open the suitcases without obtaining Jaras’s explicit
consent to the search. Id. The court held that the driver’s consent to the car did not
apply to his passenger’s property. Id. at 389–90. The court emphasized that Jaras’s
“mere acquiescence” did not count as voluntary consent to search his belongings,
particularly because the officers failed to ask for permission. Id. at 390.
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officer would be aware of it and not violate it.239 Therefore, the
officer in this case should have been aware of it and not violated it.240
Because he did violate it, he acted flagrantly when searching the
defendant’s bag.241
Second, the court determined that the officer was not subjectively
culpable.242 Specifically, the court did not believe the officer
subjectively intended to elicit the defendant’s confession to the
cocaine by illegally searching her bag.243 While stating that the officer
who searched the defendant’s purse was flagrant in doing so, the
court ultimately concluded that the illegal search of the purse was still
sufficiently attenuated from the discovery of the cocaine because
“[n]othing suggests that [the officer] searched [the defendant]’s bags
to gain leverage to exact her confession to other drugs in the car, nor
did his discovery that she had possession of a small quantity of
marijuana compel her to confess to possession of a large quantity of
cocaine when it was later found.”244 The court afforded the officer’s
lack of subjective culpability more weight than it afforded its own
finding of flagrancy. Accordingly, the court found in favor of
attenuation.245
In United States v. Gross,246 the Sixth Circuit similarly separated
purpose from flagrancy. Flagrancy again depended on the clarity of
case law. Purpose, however, did not require specific intent from the
officer to be sufficiently culpable to justify exclusion, as it did in
Fuller. Rather, the court required subjective awareness of the
illegality, a slightly lower level of culpability.247
In Gross, an officer noticed a legally parked car with the defendant
sitting in the passenger seat.248 The officer ran the license plate of the
car and found no arrest warrants in the car owner’s name.249 Still, the
239. See United States v. Cantu, 426 F. App’x 253, 257–58 (5th Cir. 2011).
240. See id. at 258.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 259.
246. 662 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2011).
247. Fuller required specific intent, which requires proof that the officer had a
specific purpose in mind when committing the illegality. See United States v. Fuller,
120 F. Supp. 3d 669, 689 (E.D. Mich. 2015). Awareness of illegality is a slightly lower
burden to prove because it does not require a specific thought, only the subjective
awareness of circumstances making particular conduct illegal. See Gross, 662 F.3d at
406.
248. Gross, 662 F.3d at 396.
249. Id.
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officer exited his vehicle and approached the car, asking what the
defendant was doing.250 He responded that he had been over at his
girlfriend’s house.251 During the conversation, the officer noticed a
“partially consumed bottle of Remy Martin cognac.”252 After being
asked several times, the passenger verbally identified himself.253 The
officer ran a warrant check, which revealed the passenger had an
outstanding felony warrant for carrying a concealed weapon.254 He
arrested him and searched him at the precinct but could not find a
gun.255 Shortly after the defendant went to the bathroom, officers
found a gun there.256 Two months later, the defendant confessed to
having the gun.257 Ultimately, the confession was admissible under
the attenuation exception.258
When evaluating the purpose part of the purpose and flagrancy
factor, the court held that the officer’s state of mind during the illegal
investigatory stop was not sufficiently culpable to tilt the purpose half
of this factor towards suppression. The court reasoned that the
officer was not subjectively aware that his conduct was illegal.259 This
standard did not depend on the officer’s specific intent to engage in
an arrest or search without probable cause, as it did in Cantu. Rather,
it depended on a slightly lower level of culpability: whether he
subjectively “knew [he] did not have probable cause” to act as he
did.260 The court inferred that, because he did not “immediately [ask]
several questions related to criminal activity other than trespassing,”

250. Id. at 397.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. (“Gross entered a restroom pod that obscured Williams’s view of Gross
from the shoulder down. A short time later, officers discovered a .380 caliber firearm
near the toilet that Gross had used.”).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 402.
259. See id. at 406. This court also does not explicitly use the term reckless here.
However, the way the court interprets the purpose factor most closely resembles the
Model Penal Code’s definition of criminal recklessness.
260. Id. at 406 (quoting United States v. Shaw, 464 F.3d 615, 631 (6th Cir. 2006)).
Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (AM. LAW. INST. 1962) (requiring that
a particular result be the specific intent or “conscious object” of the actor), with id.
§ 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (requiring that the actor be subjectively aware that his conduct will
produce a certain result).
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he must have subjectively thought he was acting within the
permissible scope of behavior.261
When evaluating the flagrancy within the overall “purpose and
flagrancy” factor, the court applied the same objective clarity of case
law standard as in Cantu and Fuller.262 The court found that the
officer’s illegal investigatory stop was not flagrant because the belief
that his conduct constituted a legal consensual encounter was
reasonable.263 The court reasoned that because the specific case law
establishing his conduct as an investigatory stop rather than a
consensual encounter was decided after the events of this case had
occurred, his mistake was reasonable.264 Therefore, the conduct
could not have been flagrant.265
III. THE NEED TO RETURN TO OBJECTIVITY
The above cases from the lower courts demonstrate that significant
disagreement persists regarding how to define flagrant misconduct in
the attenuation exception. Herring’s culpability standard lies at the
heart of this disagreement. The Court should not have changed
course in Herring v. United States when it adopted a new culpabilitybased standard under the good faith exception. Similarly, the Court
should not have transposed this approach in Utah v. Strieff to analyze
the attenuation exception’s “purpose and flagrancy” factor.
When an officer’s subjective culpability is considered in the
purpose and flagrancy factor analysis, the entire attenuation analysis
suffers because it unjustifiably weighs too heavily against the
defendant.266 Originally, the prosecution bore the burden of proof in
demonstrating that discovery of evidence was sufficiently attenuated
from the officer’s illegality. However, under the current culpability
standard, the defense unjustly bears the burden to prove the officer’s
state of mind when committing an illegal act.267 Further, application
of this culpability standard results in outcomes that provide incentives
to commit police misconduct rather than avoid it.

261. See Gross, 662 F.3d at 406 (quoting United States v. Williams, 615 F.3d 657,
670–71 (6th Cir. 2010)).
262. Id. at 405–06.
263. Id.
264. Id. (“[I]t was not until . . . [United States v. See], decided after the events in
this case, that it would have been clear to [the officer] that his methods were
decidedly an investigatory stop and not a consensual encounter.”).
265. Id. at 406.
266. See supra Section I.B.4.
267. See supra Section I.C.3.
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Accordingly, flagrancy should be defined according to an objective
standard, not a subjective standard. Specifically, flagrancy of an
illegal act should depend—as it did in Fuller, Cantu, and Gross—on
whether a reasonable officer would have committed it, based on
clarity of case law precedent at the time of the offense.268 However,
unlike in those three cases, the Court should not require proof of any
level of subjective culpability. Flagrancy should be found when an
officer unreasonably violates the law according to a reasonable officer
standard. Further, flagrancy should be the only determination within
the final attenuation factor—“purpose” should be removed.
Section III.A evaluates why a subjective culpability standard
should be rejected and thus why the final attenuation factor should
depend solely on an objective determination of flagrancy.
Section III.B demonstrates how an objective flagrancy standard based
on clarity and longevity of case law could better replace what
currently exists.
A. Impracticalities of Subjectivity
The government is supposed to bear the burden of proof when
arguing an exception to the exclusionary rule.269 Scholars correctly
predicted, however, that Herring would lead to a heightened burden
for the defendant. Further, scholars also correctly predicted that
Herring would complete a shift in Fourth Amendment case law to
include an officer’s subjective state of mind as a relevant factor. The
first part of this section addresses the defendant’s heightened burden
of proof under a subjective standard. The second part of this section
shows why this shift in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is
unnecessary.

268. See, e.g., United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 405–06 (6th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Cantu, 426 F. App’x 253, 258 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Fuller, 120 F.
Supp. 3d 669, 689 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (“An officer’s conduct is flagrant if it violates
well-established legal rules.”).
269. See generally Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963)
(holding that after defense proves that officer conduct was illegal, the burden shifts to
the prosecution to prove, in the context of attenuation, that “the evidence . . . has
been come at by . . . means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint”); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 390–92 (1920) (after
defendant alleged the search or seizure was illegal, the burden shifted to the
prosecution to prove that the exclusionary rule should not apply).
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Defendant’s Burden Is Too High

United States v. Cantu 270 demonstrates how the defendant’s

heightened burden to prove subjective culpability results in an
improper evidentiary outcome. The case depended on whether the
purpose and flagrancy factor weighed in favor of suppression or not.
The court correctly declared that the officer’s behavior was flagrant
because the case law pertaining to the officer’s particular behavior
was perfectly clear and long established.271 However, because the
defendant could not additionally prove that the officer subjectively
intended to use the marijuana he illegally found to “exact her
confession to other drugs in the car . . . ,” the Fifth Circuit deemed he
was not sufficiently culpable to tip the entire “purpose and flagrancy”
factor towards exclusion.272
The Fifth Circuit should not have required the defendant to prove
the officer’s subjective state of mind at the time of his illegal act. The
flagrancy determination alone should have made up the entirety of
the third attenuation factor. The only evidence available to the
defendant pertinent to the officer’s intent at the time of the illegal
search was what he told the defendant after she was already
arrested273: that she should “help herself out” and that “if there are
any more narcotics in the vehicle, you know, and stuff like that we
should know about, I mean, you should let us know.”274 This
statement supports the argument that the officer “improperly”
intended to use his arrest of Cantu—which was based on the
marijuana—to gain evidence regarding the cocaine. Still, the court
was unconvinced. The outcome of this case demonstrates the
heightened burden on defendant that is created by inserting a
subjective culpability consideration into the purpose and flagrancy
factor.
The court’s decision in United States v. Belt demonstrates that a
similar problem occurs when flagrancy is directly equated with proof
of a subjective state of mind.275 In Belt, the Fourth Circuit
determined that the officers were not flagrant when illegally following

270. See generally Cantu, 426 F. App’x 253.
271. Id. at 257.
272. Id. at 258.
273. See supra Section I.C.3 (explaining that defendant only has limited means
available to them to prove an officer’s state of mind).
274. Cantu, 426 F. App’x at 255.
275. United States v. Belt, 609 F. App’x 745, 749–50 (4th Cir. 2015).
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the defendant’s eleven-year-old-son into defendant’s home276 because
“[n]othing indicates the troopers acted with an improper purpose.”277
The court’s assumption that the officers were not trying to use the son
to gain entry for searching purposes was based on a perceived lack of
coercion due to the defendant’s calm demeanor.278 However, the
defendant’s demeanor should not be dispositive of the officer’s
subjective state of mind. Furthermore, the court assumed the
officer’s motives were proper, demonstrating the burden shift that a
subjective standard produces in practice. Even though the court
disagreed with the officer’s decision to follow the son into the
defendant’s home, because he was not found subjectively culpable,
the evidence was ultimately admissible.

2.

No Need to Contradict Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence

Cases such as Shetler, McDaniel v. Polley, Gross, and Fuller
demonstrate that courts may be able to sometimes achieve the proper
outcome despite having a partially or fully subjective standard.
However, a subjective standard still yields improper outcomes, such
as those in Belt and Cantu. An objective flagrancy standard would
achieve the same outcomes in the cases that came out properly, and it
would also correct the outcomes of cases that came out improperly.
Accordingly, contradicting case law by applying a subjective
culpability standard in the third attenuation factor is unnecessary.
For example, the illegal search of the defendant’s home in Shetler
was objectively flagrant simply based on clearly and consistently held
precedent that consent can only be used as an exception to the
warrant requirement when it is given voluntarily.279 No reasonable
officer could ever conclude that the consent given by the defendant’s
girlfriend under the circumstances of this case was voluntary.
Furthermore, her consent was only granted after some of the officers
276. This action was illegal because “no reasonable officer would believe that
Belt’s eleven-year-old child had authority to consent to the officers’ entry into Belt’s
home, nor does the record establish that the child had actual authority to give such
consent.” Id. at 751 (Wynn, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164, 171 (1974) (requiring a third party to have common or actual authority to
consent to police entering a defendant’s premises).
277. Belt, 609 F. App’x at 750.
278. Id. at 249.
279. Consent is legally invalid unless the individual granting consent does so
voluntarily, rather than as “the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.”
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973). Further, a larger number of
officers, as was present here, is a known factor suggesting lack of voluntariness. See
generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & DAVID C. BAUM, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (5th ed. 2017).
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had already illegally entered the defendant’s home.280 This conduct
would have been objectively flagrant and would have tipped the
flagrancy factor in favor of suppression just the same, without
requiring the court to make inferences regarding subjective intent.
Similarly, the continued detention of the defendant in Fuller was
objectively flagrant based on the long-held principle that a stop is
only justifiable when reasonable suspicion exists.281 Once Officer
Montgomery realized that the defendant was not the person he was
looking for, his reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant no
longer existed. A reasonably well-trained officer would have let the
defendant go after that point. Accordingly, Officer Montgomery’s
conduct would have been deemed flagrant under an entirely objective
standard (as it was in the case).282
Cases like Gross and McDaniel v. Polley each demonstrate
situations where the officer was not acting objectively flagrantly, and
therefore applying the attenuation exception was appropriate. In
Gross, the court expressly conceded that “it was not until . . . [United
States v. See283], decided after the events in this case, that it would
have been clear to [the officer] that his methods were decidedly an
investigatory stop and not a consensual encounter.”284 Accordingly,
the court acknowledged that case law was not sufficiently clear at the
time of the questionable behavior for a reasonable officer to have
known that it was unconstitutional, and thus, his behavior was not
flagrant.285
In McDaniel v. Polley, the conduct at issue was whether placing
handcuffs on a defendant while telling him he was not under arrest
actually qualifies as an arrest.286 Applying an objective flagrancy
standard based on clarity of case law, this conduct would not be
considered flagrant. Case law is not entirely clear as to when a police
encounter escalates to an “arrest.” The standard currently applied by
the courts to determine whether conduct constitutes an arrest is
whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave.287 The lower
court concluded that handcuffing the defendant constituted an
280. United States v. Shetler, 665 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2011).
281. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) (establishing that an officer need not
have full probable cause to conduct a stop and frisk, so long as the officer reasonably
believes his physical safety is in danger due to a weapon).
282. See generally United States v. Fuller, 120 F. Supp. 3d 669 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
283. 574 F.3d 309 (6th Cir. 2009).
284. United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 405–06 (6th Cir. 2011).
285. Id. at 406.
286. See supra Section II.B.
287. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983).
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arrest,288 but handcuffs do not always mean someone is under
arrest.289 Therefore, the officer in this case reasonably believed his
conduct did not constitute an arrest. He would not be flagrant under
an objective standard, just as he was not found flagrant under a
standard considering subjective culpability.
B.

Flagrancy Should Be Based on Clarity of Case Law

The flagrancy standard applied in Fuller, Cantu, and Gross
(separate from the purpose factor in those cases) solves the above
problems that the subjective approach creates because it is an entirely
objective standard. Whether a violation is flagrant or not should
depend on whether case law clearly and consistently has established
the constitutionality of the conduct in question.

1.

Burden Properly Relieved

Applying an objective flagrancy standard based on clarity of case
law will return the defendant’s burden of proof at the suppression
hearing to its proper level.290 The government is supposed to bear the
burden of proof when arguing an exception to the exclusionary
rule.291 However, currently, most courts presume an officer’s
subjective intent to be legal until proven otherwise.292 Accordingly,
the current Herring flagrancy standard requires the defendant to find
evidence of the officer’s subjective state of mind.293 Because the
testimony of an officer will rarely include evidence of intent, the
defendant is at a severe disadvantage because all he has are his firsthand observations of the officer’s conduct.294 Such evidence only
circumstantially demonstrates an officer’s intent and requires courts
to make speculative inferences, which they are loathe to do.295
In Utah v. Strieff, the defendant’s burden of proof would have
been significantly relieved if the Court determined flagrancy under an
objective standard based on clarity of case law precedent. In Strieff,
the government only had one statement regarding the officer’s

288. McDaniel v. Polley, 847 F.3d 887, 892 (7th Cir. 2017) (“The trial court ruled
that the officers arrested McDaniel when they handcuffed him at his home . . . ”).
289. See, e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009) (holding that a stop did
not escalate to an arrest simply because the officers handcuffed the defendant).
290. Moreno, supra note 81, at 52–55.
291. See generally Moreno, supra note 84.
292. Moreno, supra note 81, at 54; see also Kerr, supra note 154.
293. Id. at 54.
294. Id. at 55.
295. See generally Moreno, supra note 84.
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purpose.296 At the suppression hearing, when asked why he stopped
Strieff, Fackrell replied that Strieff “was coming out of the house”
that he had been watching and he wanted to “find out what was going
on in the house . . . [and] what Strieff was doing there.”297 The Court
decided, within the purpose and flagrancy factor of the attenuation
analysis, that Fackrell’s decision was a “good faith” mistake.298 It
remains unclear how this generic statement that he wanted to
investigate the case met the government’s burden to show good
faith.299 Still, the Court found the officer’s conduct was not
flagrant.300
However, a flagrancy standard like that in Fuller, Cantu, or Gross
(but not including the separate “purpose” consideration) would have
yielded a different—and appropriate—outcome. The only burden
would be to discern the clarity of case law surrounding stops,
particularly whether a reasonable officer would know that without
seeing when someone leaves a suspected drug house, he does not
have the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop the individual.301 In
Utah v. Strieff, a reasonable officer would have known he did not
have enough evidence to stop the individual.302 Thus, the officer’s
conduct was flagrant, and the flagrancy factor of the attenuation
analysis would favor suppression.

2.

Court Can Choose What It Wants to Dis-Incentivize

Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Ginsburg were concerned that the
outcome of Strieff would incentivize officers to commit future
illegalities.303 Applying an objective flagrancy standard will allow
courts to more clearly delineate the behavior that they aim to deter or
dis-incentivize. For example, in Belt, even though the court disagreed
with the troopers’ decision to follow the defendant’s son into the
home instead of conducting the planned knock and talk, the court
decided the troopers’ actions were not flagrant. The dissent,
however, acknowledged that alternatives were available to them: “the
officers could easily have knocked on his door, identified themselves,

296. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
297. Id. at 2072 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 2063. The Court did not explain why it used the words “good faith” in
the context of the attenuation exception.
299. Kerr, supra note 154.
300. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063.
301. See supra Section I.C.3.
302. Moreno, supra note 81, at 48.
303. See supra Section I.C.2.
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and sought Belt’s consent before entering.”304 Further, the dissent
highlights that “[t]hese alternatives would have avoided not only
violating Belt’s Fourth Amendment rights but also the oft-cited safety
risks involved when officers confront individuals in their homes
without warning.”305
Applying a flagrancy standard based on the clarity of case law
would aim to deter future officers from using a defendant’s child as a
way around valid consent. It would incentivize them to choose the
alternatives that the court highlighted. Courts handling cases with
facts similar to those of this case consistently make clear that an
eleven-year-old son of the defendant under these circumstances
would not have valid authority to allow officers to enter the
defendant’s home.306 A reasonably well-trained officer should be
aware of such precedents. Therefore, under an objective flagrancy
standard, officers like those in Belt could be deterred from similar
conduct in the future if their conduct was deemed flagrant, and the
attenuation exception had not been applied.
CONCLUSION
When subjective intent is considered in analyzing the third
attenuation factor, the defendant is put at too much of a
disadvantage. It is inherently difficult to prove an officer’s intent
when the record is more often than not devoid of evidence of what
the officer was thinking. This consequence is evident in Strieff, where
the defendant could not prove the officer was sufficiently subjectively
culpable, and thus the officer’s discovery of an arrest warrant was
considered an intervening circumstance that severed causation.307

304. United States v. Belt, 609 F. App’x 745, 754 (2015) (Wynn, J., dissenting).
Further, Judge Wynn acknowledged the officers could have “ask[ed] Belt’s son to
retrieve his father from the home.” Id.
305. Id.
306. See, e.g., Saavedra v. State, 622 So. 2d 952, 959 (Fla. 1993) (holding that the
accused’s fifteen-year-old son could not provide valid consent for the police to enter
accused’s home when police had no warrant and had not elicited facts to suggest son
had authority over premises); State v. Ellis, 210 P.3d 144, 148, 150–53 (Mont. 2009)
(holding that defendant’s thirteen-year-old daughter could not give valid consent to
search of father’s residence or her own bedroom).
307. In Strieff, the warrant check was perceived as an intervening circumstance,
and the majority did not seem to view it as a “foreseeable consequence” the same
way the dissenters did. Compare Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016), with id.
at 2073 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Had the majority viewed Fackrell’s conduct as
flagrant, it probably would have also believed that the outstanding warrant was a
foreseeable consequence based on traditional practice and the incredibly high
amount of outstanding warrants that exist.
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Therefore, the officer essentially got away with creating his own
probable cause. This unfair consequence indicates that subjective
intent is not an appropriate consideration in the context of flagrancy.
Such burden inappropriately subverts the justice system’s principle
that a defendant is “innocent until proven guilty.”
Further, it is not readily apparent that basing suppression rulings
on officers’ mens rea actually achieves the Court’s stated goal of
promoting officer deterrence. Because of the high burden involved in
proving subjective culpability, actions that would otherwise be
deemed flagrant under an objective standard end up being
categorized as innocent mistakes more often than flagrant
violations—as was the case in Strieff. Accordingly, using subjective
intent to determine admissibility significantly limits the power the
Court actually has in delineating the kind of conduct it finds
impermissible. Instead, using a subjective intent standard provides
incentive to ignore constitutional limits, as Justices Sotomayor,
Kagan, and Ginsburg fear.
Therefore, the best solution is to remove the subjective intent
analysis completely from the purpose and flagrancy factor. The new
final attenuation factor should simply be determining whether the
officer’s conduct was flagrant. An officer should be deemed flagrant
when he violates case law that has been so clear and well-established
that any reasonably well-trained officer would be aware of it and its
implications. Under this standard, the exclusionary rule can avoid
being further narrowed, the courts will be less burdened, and the
defendant is actually treated as innocent until proven guilty.

